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Abstract
This paper develops an equilibrium theory for two-person two-criteria 
stochastic decision problems with static information patterns, wherein the 
decision makers (DM’s) have different probabilistic models of the underlying 
process, the objective functionals are quadratic and the decision spaces are 
general inner-product spaces. Under two different modes of decision making 
(viz. symmetric and asymmetric), sufficient conditions are obtained for the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium solutions (stable in the former case), and in 
each case a uniformly convergent iterative scheme is developed whereby the equilibrium 
policies of the DM's can be obtained by evaluating a number of conditional 
expectations. When the probability measures are Gaussian, the equilibrium solution 
is linear under the symmetric mode of decision making, whereas it is generically 
nonlinear in the asymmetric case, with the linear structure prevailing only in 
some special cases which are delineated in the paper.
11. Introduction
A team is defined as a group of agents who work together in a 
coordinated effort, in a possibly hostile and uncertain environment, in order 
to achieve a common goal. In achieving this goal, the members of the team 
do not necessarily acquire the same information, and hence they have to operate 
in a decentralized mode of decision making. The scientific approach to 
formulation and analysis of team problems has involved (i) a quantification of 
the underlying common goal in the form of a (mathematical) objective function 
which is sought to be optimized jointly by the agents, and (ii) a modeling 
of the uncertain environment and the possible measurements made by the agents 
on this environment in the form of a probability space together with an 
appropriate information structure [14,7,15,16]. The underlying stipulation here 
has been the existence of a probability space that is common to all the agents, 
so that through their priors all members of the team "see the world" in exactly 
the same way.
One question that readily comes into mind at this point is the 
robustness of such a mathematical model, and the "optimum" solutions it produces, 
to slight variations in the underlying assumptions. In particular, what if the 
agents perceive the outside world in slightly different ways? Would the 
solution obtained under the assumption of common prior probability measures 
change drastically if there are discrepancies in the agents' perceptions of the 
probabilistic description of the outside world? In order to be able to answer 
these queries satisfactorily and effectively, we need a theory of equilibrium 
for decision problems in which the decision makers (DM's) have different 
probabilistic models of the system; such a general theory will clearly subsume 
the currently available results on teams which use a common probability space.
2Consider a static team decision problem, formulated in the standard 
manner as in [7], with the only difference being in the underlying probability 
space. In particular, assume that the DM’s assign different subjective 
probabilities to the uncertain events, in which case there will not exist a 
common probability space, thereby leading to a different expected (average) 
cost function for each DM. Hence, once we relax the assumption of existence 
of a common probability space, the team problem is no longer a stochastic 
optimization problem with a single objective functional, and we inevitably 
have to treat it as a nonzero-sum stochastic game [5,8,12]. Furthermore, even 
though the original team decision problem with a common probability space 
will admit the same team-optimal solution(s) regardless of the mode of 
decision making (that is, regardless of whether the roles of the DM's are 
symmetric or whether there is a hierarchy and dominance in decision making), 
this feature ceases to hold true when there exists a discrepancy between the 
perceived probability measures. When there are only two members, for example, 
two possibilities emerge in the presence of discrepancies: the totally
symmetric roles, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium solution, and the 
hierarchical mode,corresponding to the Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
Motivated by these considerations, we treat in this paper a more 
general (than team) class of two-person stochastic decision problems which 
can be viewed as static stochastic nonzero-sum games with the DM's having 
different subjective probability measures. Adopting both the symmetric and 
asymmetric modes of decision making, we develop in each case a general 
theory of equilibrium when the objective functionals are quadratic and the
3decision spaces are appropriate Hilbert spaces. Such a formulation includes both 
finite-dimensional (discrete) and continuous-time decision problems, and involves 
arbitrary probability measures which are, though, restricted a posteriori by the 
conditions of existence and uniqueness developed in the paper. The special case of 
Gaussian distributions is studied in considerable depth, and some explicit solutions 
are obtained with appealing features.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section (§2) 
provides a precise problem formulation, and introduces the two solution concepts 
adopted in the paper. Section 3 develops general conditions for existence and 
uniqueness of a stable equilibrium solution under the symmetric mode of decision 
making, and elucidates the extent of the restrictions imposed on the problem by 
these conditions. Section 4 presents a counterpart of the results of Section 3 
under the asymmetric mode of decision making, with the mathematical machinery 
used being inherently different from that of §3. Section 5 deals with the special 
class of Gaussian distributions, under both symmetric and asymmetric modes of 
decision making. In the former case it is shown that the unique stable equilibrium 
solution is affine in the measurements and can be obtained explicitly. In the 
latter case, however, the solution is generically nonlinear, and contains summation 
of terms which involve products of linear functions of measurements with exponential 
terms (whose exponents are quadratic in the measurements). The section also contains 
some discussion on finite-dimensional and continuous-time problems, treated as 
special cases. Section 6 is devoted to discussions on possible extensions of 
these results in different directions, provides some interpretation of the 
general approach and results, and includes some concluding remarks. The paper ends 
with five Appendices which include results used in the main body of the paper.
42. Mathematical Formulation and Some Basic Results
2.1. Probability Spaces
mi mr
Let = l n x 1  x 1R = X x x Y^, B denote the Borel field
1c 1cof subsets of fi, and B denote the Borel field of subsets of 1  , k = n, m^, m^.
Let P denote the set of all probability measures on (ft,B) with finite second
moments, and for each P£ P denote the corresponding marginal measures on
mi nun “u 2B , B and B by P , P and P , respectively. Furthermore, let the
X yl y2
collection of all such probability measures be denoted by P , P and P ,
X yl y2
respectively. Then, for each P£ P, the vector z = (x^, y^, y^)'» taking values
in ft, becomes a well-defined random vector on (ft,B,p), and likewise x is a
m . m.
random vector on (1R , B ,P ) and y. is a random vector on (H ,B ,P ).
yi
Here, x denotes the unknown state of Nature, and y^ denotes an
observation of DMi (i'th decision maker) which is correlated with x. We now
1 2choose two elements out of P, P and P , which denote the subjective probabilities
assigned to z by DMI and DM2, respectively. For technical reasons, we place
1 2some further restrictions on the choices of P and P through the marginals 
P1 ; in particular we assume that
yi
J . . 1 2 2Conation (1). P and P are absolutely continuous [1] with respect to P
± y2 yl y2
and P , respectively; that is, using the standard notation in probability
theory,
< < P 2 1P < < PYi y- (l)
Condition (2). The Radon-Nikodym (R-N) derivative [1]
81(0 = dpJ / dP1 ,
yi (2)
is uniformly bounded a.e. P1 , i=l,2.
yi
5The necessity of these two conditions in the formulation of our problem will be
made clear in the sequel. We should note, however, that for the special case 
1 2when P is equivalent to P , both of these conditions are satisfied (in the latter 
case the bound is equal to 1) and we have the standard decision theoretic framework
[2] with a single probability space.
2.2. Decision and Policy Spaces
The decision variable of DMi will be denoted by ui which belongs to a 
real separable Hilbert space Ik with inner product (',*)^* Permissible policies 
(decision rules) for DMi are measurable mappings 
mi o •
Y± : ]R -* Ik , /Hyi(^)Hi P^ (d£) < °° (3)
where II* IL is the natural norm derived from (*,*)^. Let Ik denote the space of 
all such policies, which is further equipped with the inner product
<  Y.e >. - / (y C O . s c D ) .  p *
Y. yi1
(dÇ) (4)
Then, we have the following two results the first of which is standard [3] and
the second one involves a change of measures using the R-N derivative.
Lemma 1. Ik is a Hilbert space. □
Lemma 2. If Conditions Cl) and (2) are satisfied, every element of Ik has
bounded second-order moments also under P^ , j^i.
yi
2.3. Cost Functionals
1  4-
Let °jj: Uj » i>j=l>2) be strongly positive bounded linear
operators, and F^: X U, be bounded linear operators for all i,i=l,2.J 3
Furthermore, let E [y (z)|y^] denote the mathematical expectation of a
uGU. . J
i* iThat is, there exists a > 0 such that (u,D..u). > a(u,u). for all3 J 3 - 3
6z-measurable random variable y1(z) taking values in IL conditioned on the 
random variable y., and under the probability measure p1, i.e.
E [y(z)|yj = |y(z)p| (dzjy^) (5)
where the second term of the integrand is the conditional probability measure 
derived from P1. Then, for each pair Cy^>Y2) £ x T ^ , we have a quadratic expected 
cost functional for each DM, defined for DMi by
Ji < v V  < V 5)* d3V j U ) ) 3 Py.(dC) " <T*’ El[Fix|yi]>i
j J
- / (y ,(5), F^x) P1(dx,Y ,d?) - <Y±, E1 [D^ y (y )|y.]>i 
YvY J j J
( 6)
XxY. J
every term of which can be shown to be finite, in view of Lemmas 1 and 2. Note 
that in the absence of Conditions (1) and (2), is not necessarily finite and 
hence the problem is not well defined.
It is worth mentioning here that describes a most general type of 
quadratic cost functional which is strictly convex in u^, and that the formulation 
here covers also the cases of team problems
> i _ 1 _ 2* + 1 2
' jj ^’ ^12 ~~ ^21* Fi ~ Fi’ i*J) and zero-sum games
i i 2* 1 2
D^jj °12 ~ ~ D21’ Fi Fi* i^j). But even in these "single
loss-functional" problems, the DM's will have inherently different expected 
cost functions whenever P1 and P 2 are different, since then a common probability 
space does not exist. This forces us to formulate the problem as a multi­
criteria optimization problem and introduce equilibrium solution concepts that 
would be appropriate in this framework.
•j* ^
A superscript ( ) designates the adjoint of a given linear operator 
defined on a Hilbert space, and I designates the identity operator.
72.4. Equilibrium Solution Under the Symmetric Mode of Decision Making
Since the expected cost functionals (6), together with the policy spaces, 
provide a normal (strategic) form description, regardless of the presence of 
multiple probability measures, the standard definition of noncooperative (Nash) 
equilibrium [5] remains intact, which is the most reasonable solution concept 
here under the symmetric mode of decision making.
Definition 1. A pair of policies (y°>Y2) G ^1 x ^2 const^t:utes a Nash equilibrium 
solution if
‘V Y1,Y2^  - J1^y1,y 2^  ’ J2^y1*y 2^  - J2^y1,y 2^  5 ¥yl G ri* y2 G F2
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium solution (Y-^ jY^) is stable if for all
< ^ 0) >Y20)) E Y  X Y ’
(7)
□
_ . (k) o . r
l i m  Y ; = Y. > m  T
k-x»
i=l,2, ( 8)
where
(k) . t (= arg m m  j 1(y 1>Y2 )
F1
(9a)
,(k) _ arg min J?(Yn 
r2
(k-l) ,T2) , k=l,2 (9b)
Remark 1. The notion of stable equilibrium makes particular sense (and is of 
paramount importance) in decision problems wherein the DM’s have different priors 
on the uncertain quantities, because it is determined as the outcome of a natural 
iterative process. In this process, each DM responds optimally (using his priors) 
to the most recent decision (policy) of the other DM, with the priors on which 
this decision is based being irrelevant. In other words, even though the computation 
of the Nash equilibrium solution will depend on the different prior probability
8measures perceived by two DM’s, in the iterative procedure that leads to this 
equilibrium each DM has to know only his own prior and the other one’s announced 
policy at the previous step. For an earlier utilization of this concept in a 
deterministic setting we refer the reader to [28]. □
2.5. Equilibrium Solution Under an Asymmetric Mode of Decision Making
In the case of the asymmetric mode there is a hierarchy in decision
making, which permits one DM (say DM1— leader) to announce and enforce his policy
on the other DM (follower). The relevant solution concept here is the leader-
follower (Stackelberg) solution which is introduced below.
s sDefinition 3. A pair of policies (Y-l>Y2) e x constitutes a leader-follower 
(Stackelberg) equilibrium solution with unique follower responses, if there exists 
a unique mapping T^ : -> V satisfying
j2(Yi >t2[Yi]) < j2(Yi »Y2) » V(Yi,Y2) G ri x r2 (10)
and furthermore
J1(y1 ’T2 [y1]) - J1(y1’T2[y1]) > ¥yl s ri (11)
with
S m r S ,
t2 = T2[Yl] .
Remark 2. The uniqueness condition on T^ is satisfied in our case, because is 
strictly convex (and quadratic) in y^ . D
Remark 3. The solution introduced above may not, at first glance, appear to be an 
equilibrium solution, because of the strict ordering of the DM’s. However, it can 
be shown, by following an argument first developed in [17], that the Stackelberg 
solution can be viewed as the so-called "strong equilibrium" of a decision problem 
with a modified (dynamic) information pattern [see Appendix E]. □
93. General Conditions for a Stable Equilibrium Solution 
Under the Symmetric Mode
We now obtain some general conditions for existence of stable equilibrium 
solutions under the symmetric mode of decision making, and also consider some 
special cases when the probability measures of both DM’s are absolutely continuous 
with respect to the Lebesgue measure (i.e. when densities exist). Firstly we have 
Proposition 1. A pair of policies (y°,Y°) e x constitutes a Nash equilibrium 
solution to the decision problem of §2, if, and only if, it satisfies the pair of 
equations (under the notation of (5)):
Yl(yl) = D12 bil + 4  E1 [x|y1] (12a)
Y2 (y= ®21 e2 I y2 ] + F2 E2 [x I y2 ]. (12b)
Proof. This result follows from a simple minimization of the two quadratic forms 
dfCYl»Y^) and J2^Y1,Y2^  °n the tWO Hilbert spaces T and T2, respectively, and by 
virtue of the fact that these two quadratic forms are positive definite in the 
relevant variables. □
By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 1, relations (9a) 
and (9b) in Def. 2 can equivalently be written as
(k) _ nl -lr (k-1) . N| , 1 1 ,
i - Di2 e tY2 (y2>lyd + Y  E [xlyU (13a)
(k) _ 2 2. (k-1), . | , 2 2 ,2 - D21 E tYj Cy1)|y2J + F2 E [x|y ] , k=l,2, . . . .  (l3b)
Now, substituting (13b) into (13a), and also (13a) into (13b), by appropriately 
matching the superscripts, we arrive at the following two recursive relations:
Yik)(yi) = DijDji El[EJ [Yf 2)(y1)|yj]|yi] + E1fx|y1] ,
( U)
+ d Y F j E1 [E:)[x|yj]|y1] , j ,1-1,2; k-2,4,... or k=3,5
10
Note that if the recursive scheme (14) converges for even values of k, it also 
converges (to the same limit) for odd values of k [this follows from expressions 
(13a)-(13b)]. Hence, we confine attention only to even values of k and obtain the 
following result as a direct consequence of the foregoing analysis:
Proposition 2. A pair of policies Cy° >Y^) e x constitutes a stable Nash 
equilibrium solution if, and only if, for all (y ^ ^ jY^^) e x T^9
Y ° ( y i )  = l i m  Y^2k ^ (y 1 ) i n  I\ , (15)
k-x»
(2k) -where y) , k=l,2,..., is given recursively by (14). Furthermore, such a stable 
equilibrium solution is necessarily unique. D
Let us now introduce linear operators : I\ -> r , i=l,2, by
5i(Y) = DijDji El[Ej[’i'(yi) bj] Iy±3 > (i6>
Note that indeed maps into T., because the conditional expectation 
EJ [D^iy(y±)|y^] maps I\ into r (j^i) when the probability measures satisfy 
Conditions (1) and (2), and every element of I\ is square-integrable under both P 
and P^ (cf. Lemma 2).y.
i
Furthermore, let us introduce the notation « $ »  to denote the norm
of a linear bounded operator $: V. -> T., which is defined byi i  J
1 /2
« $ »  = sup [<3y,5y>./<Y,Y>. ] , (17a)
yGr. 1l
and r^(£) to denote the spectral radius of £, which is defined by [see Appendix A]
r .(£) = lim sup [«£k>> (17b)
1 k-x»
where $ denotes the k ’th power of $. Finally, let us introduce the linear
operators
11
Ï ï 1 è D1 . D?. ij Ji
and
= fA Tf.^ r •P . I .  E [EJ [• y . ] y .]i|i 1 7j 71
(18a)
(18b)
both of which map I\ into itself (the former also maps IL into itself). Then, 
the following Proposition, whose proof depends on a contraction mapping 
argument (see Appendix B), provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for existence of the unique equilibrium solution alluded to in Prop.- 2.
Theorem 1. (i) Under Conditions (1) and (2), the decision problem of Section 2 admits 
a unique stable Nash equilibrium solution given by (15) if, and only if, there exists, 
for at least one i=l,2, a p1, 0<p1<l, such that
r . (?.) = r.CD1?.,.) < p1 . (19)1 1 1 1 1  -
(ii) A set of sufficient conditions for (19) to hold true is the existence 
of a pair of positive scalars (p^,p2), such that
1 l  _ , - i x l  N i
P1P2<1 , r ± (D ) < Px , r i (p i | i ) < P2 (20a)
Furthermore, a set of sufficient conditions for the latter two is
“i - h —in l - l<<D >>. = IlD II . < p„ , « P . i . » .  < pl l -  l ’ i i i -  2 (20b)
where 11*11 denotes the operator norm on U_^ , as a counterpart of (17a) 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Part (ii) of Thm. 1 provides a partial separation (in terms of sufficient 
conditions) of the deterministic and stochastic parts of the system. Now, if 
the decision problem is a team problem with a common loss functional [which 
requires D22 = I, D12 = D21, F^ = F^ and F2 = F^J, and if team cost is strictly
12
convex in the pair (u^jU^) [which is true if and only if ® ^ 2^12^1 = P < 1] » it
1 2follows that the first inequality holds with p^ = p^ < 1. If, furthermore, the
subjective probability measures assigned to the pair ^y the two DM's are
equivalent, P^|^ becomes the product of two projection operators, thus leading
1 2to satisfaction of the second inequality in (20b) with p^  = p^  = 1, and thereby to 
satisfaction of (20a). Hence, as a corollary to the second part of Prop. 3, we
•j*
obtain the following result which is known in different contexts [7,8,9].
Corollary 1. For the strictly convex quadratic team problem with equivalent subjective
probability measures assigned by the two DM's to ^ 2^ 2)» there exists a unique stable
equilibrium solution (the so-called team-optimal solution), irrespective of the
underlying common probability measure. D
1 2For team problems with P $P , a result along the lines of Corollary 1 does
not in general hold, because the operator P_^  j^  is not necessarily the product of two
projection operators. Then, the general condition is (19) [or the stronger one, (20a)]
which places some restrictions on the parameters of the cost functional, as well as
1 2the probability measures P and P . To delineate the extent of these restrictions, 
we now study the second inequality of (20b) somewhat further and obtain the following 
sufficient condition.
Corollary 2. For a given p^, the second inequality of (20b) is satisfied if the 
expression
g1(y,)E^[g^(y ) |y ] = g1(y1)/ (n)P^ . (dn|ç = y.)
-L j  ■*- v y 4 y .j 1 (21a)Y.J
i 2 iis uniformly bounded from above by (p ) a.e. P . Furthermore, if the probability
1 yi1 2measures P and P are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, 
this condition can be expressed equivalently in terms of the probability densities 
P^y^iYj) as follows:
This result is slightly more general than the related ones that can be 
found in [7,8,9], since here pi is allowed to be different from P^, though still a 
restriction is imposed on these (indirectly) via the equivalence between P^ and
^i.y2- yl,y2
13
Py.(yi) .
—-1- - -  I [p^ (n)p^ Cn|y.)/p^ Cn)]dn < (pb2
(y±) Y yj yj|yi yjy± j
Proof. For (21a) see Appendix C; (21b) follows readily from (21a).
(21b)
□
14
4. General Sufficient Conditions for a Stackelberg 
Equilibrium Solution
We now turn our attention to the asymmetric mode of decision making, 
obtain some general sufficient conditions for existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium 
solution, and provide a complete characterization of the solution. Subsequently we 
consider some special cases with some further structure imposed on the cost functionals 
and the probability measures.
Firstly we obtain an expression for DM2’s unique reaction T2: -* as
defined by (10), using Prop. 1:
T2 [y13 = Y2(y2) = D21E2[Yl (yl) ly2] + F2£2[xly2] • (22)
sHence, the derivation of the leader's Stackelberg policy y ^ r  involves (in view of 
(11)) the minimization of over after y° given by (22) is substituted in. This 
substitution yields
J ( y )  = J1 ( y , y ° )  = j  <Y»Y>1 + \  !  (F^E^[x|y2 ]
Y2
+ D21E2 [y (Y1 ) |y 2] » D ^ D ^ E2 [Y (y x ) |y2 ] + D22F2E2 X^ ly 2 ^ 2  PF^(dS)
(23)
- <y,E1 [F^x|y1J>1 + / (D^E2 [Y(y1> | y2J + F2E2 [x|y2], F2 x)2
XxY2
. P1(dx,Y1,dC)
-  <y,E1 [D22D21E2 [ Y ( y1) | y 2] | y 1 ] + E 1 [D22F2E2 [ x | y 2 ] |y 1 ]>1 ,
where we have deleted the subscript 1 in y^ in order to simplify the notation. 
Now, since is a linear space, and J is the sum of terms homogeneous of degree 
zero, one and two (maximum), any minimizing solution yGr^ will have to satisfy
15
AJ(y ; h) = J(y+h) - J(y) = 6j(y ; h) + 6zJ(y ; h) > 0 V h ^ ,
_f ^ 4«I -v ■
where 6 J(y ; h) is the Gateaux variation of J(y) of degree i. Extensive
(24)
manipulations, details of which are given in Appendix D (subsection 1), lead to
-  2 ~the following expressions for SJ and S J:
6J(y; h) = <h,y>1 - / ChCy^, ( S y ) ^ ) ) - ^  (dy^
Y  (h(y1) > 3 ^ ) ) - ^  (dyx)
(25)
*
62J(y ; h) = J <h,h>1 + -| / (h(y1) ,g1 (y1)E2 [g2(y2)D21D22D2-L
. EZ[h(^) |y2] ly^^])^ (dy^ - <h>Di2D21Pll lh>
(26)
where 2: r^ -»T^  and are defined by
1
*  *
. 2  1 *(ZyXyp = (D12D21P1|1 +
“ D21D22D21g1(y1)E2[g2(y2)E2[Y(y1)|y2]\y±]
*
3(yf) = F1E[x|y1] - D21D22F2g1(y1)E2[g2(y2)E2[x|y2]|y1]
- D^2F^E1[E2 [x|y2]|y1] + D21F2g1(y1)E2 [g2(y2)E1 tx|y2]|y1].
(27a)
(27b)
Pfll : is a linear operator given by
?l|iT(yi) = E1 [E2 [Y(yi)|y2]|yi] , (28)
t  1 ~Here 6 J is written simply as SJ.
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is the space of y^-measurable random variables taking values in U^, and g1 (^ ) are 
the R-N derivatives (2). Note that P^j^ is related to |i defined by (18b) by
?i11Ey Cyi>1 = Cpi|1Y)(y1)
where the latter (which is a mapping from into T^) has been used in (26) and will 
also be used in the sequel whenever needed.
Now, since (24) is also equivalent to
<5J(y,h) = 0 vher1
62J(y,h) >_ 0 ¥her1 ►
(29)
a Stackelberg solution y^f^ will
J
exist for the leader if, and only if,
(i) (26) is nonnegative definite,
and (from (25)):
(ii) y(yx) - (Zy)(y1) - 3(y1) = 0 , a.e. P1 
yl
(30)
Since the first of these conditions does not depend on y, the optimal solution 
is solely determined by (30), which can be rewritten as
1 J2 lr 2 *  *2  1 1
yP  = ^ 2D‘1Ei[E‘ [Y(y1)|y2]|y1] + D21D128'L(yl) E2 [g2(y2)E1 [Y(y1) |y2] |y2]
+ D21F2g1(y1)E2 [g2(y2)E1 [x|y2] |y1] D2lD22D21sl<'yl^E2 [g2^ ^ 2 [y y^p  |y2] ly3
(31)
where we have utilized the fact that the adjoint of P^ | ^  is a linear operator 
3?l|i: given by [see Appendix D, subsection 2]
17
’l|ly(yl) = / Y(n)/
Py1y2 (dnxdy2)Py1y2(dylxdy2) 
2 Py2(dy2)Py1W yi>
= S1Cy1)E2 [g2(y2)E1[Y(y1)|y2]|yi]
(32)
Furthermore, condition (i) can be rewritten as
>'c >V
A “ 1 + I D21D22D21(K+kA) - D12D21Plll “ D21DL h | l  1  0 (33)
where I: is the identity operator, and K: r ->T^  is defined by
(Ky)(y1) = g1(y1)E2[g2(y2)E2 [y(y1>|y2]|yx] (34)
We now summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Cond'it'ions (1) and (2) , the decision problem with multiple 
probability measures admits a Stackelberg equilibrium solution if, and only if,
A is nonnegative definite and (31) admits a solution in r . D
Equation (31) will, in general, not admit a closed-form solution, even 
if all random variables are jointly Gaussian distributed (see §5.3); therefore, 
we will have to resort to numerical computations which will involve a recursion of 
some type. Hence, in analyzing the conditions of existence of a solution to (31) 
we may also require that such a numerical scheme be globally convergent (or stable). 
One appealing scheme whereby a unique solution to (31) [or, equivalently, (30)] can 
be obtained is the recursion
Y0 0 ^ )  = (ZY(k_1))(y1) + S(yi) , k-1,2,... (35)
where y*'0'1 is chosen as an arbitrary element of r . If the limit lim y ®  = ys
. . k-*°°
exists in ri, for all such initial choices, then y will necessarily constitute a
solution to (31). A sufficient condition for this readily follows from 
Lemma B.l, which we give below as Prop. 4.
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Proposition 4. In addition to the conditions of Prop. 3, assume that there exists 
a scalar p, 0<p<l, such that
r(2) £  p (36)
where r(2) is the spectral radius of 2. Then, the decision problem admits a
s s sunique Stackelberg equilibrium solution (y ,T2 [y ]), where y er is the limit of 
the iterative scheme (35), and is the affine operator (22) . □
We now further elaborate on (36), so as to bring it to a form which 
separates out the contributions from the deterministic and probabilistic 
components of the problem. [Here, we are seeking sufficient conditions which 
would constitute the counterpart of (20) in this context]. Towards 
this end, let us first note that using (34) in (25a):
k k k
r(2) = r O ) ^  P , + pV  - D* D* D* K) (37)
and utilizing the inequality relationship between the spectral radius and norm 
of an operator (see Appendix A, Lemma A.l) this can be bounded from above by
k k k
i  <<DL D21?lll + D21DL h l l  - D21D22D21K>T
where << • is the operator norm as defined in (17a). Using the standard 
(triangle inequality) property of norms, this can further be bounded from above 
by
k k k
-  <<D12D21Pl|l + D21D12Pl|l>>l + <<D21D22D21K>>1 *
*
2  1 2Now since both ^21^ 22^ 21 and K map a Hilbert space (T ) into itself, using the 
norm inequality for products of linear operators, we further have
k * k
- <<D12D21Pl|l + D21D12Pl|l>>l + <<D21D22D21>>1 <<K>>1
*  *  *
■ r(DL D21?lll + D21D12hll> +
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where the equality follows because (i) the spectral radius and norm of a 
self-adjoint linear operator are equal [13,p.514], (ii) norm of a "non-self-adjoint" 
linear operator K is equal to the square root of the spectral radius of the 
self-adjoint operator K K (see Appendix A, Lemma A.l). Finally, using the result 
of Lemma A.2 (Appendix A), the latter is bounded from above by
r(2) < 2[(D^2D21D21D^2)]1/2[r(P?i,P1 | J 1/2 + r C D ^ D ^ D 2,) [r(K*K)]1/2. (38)
1  1 1 1 21 22 21'
Now, let us assume the following:
Condition (3). There exist four positive scalars p-,p ,p ,p satisfying-L Z j H
2  P 1 P 2  +  P 3 P 4  <  1 (39)
such that
k k k
rCD12D21D21I>i2)- (pl)2 > r(D21D22D21^p3
—*
r a ’i|iPi|i)£(P2) r(K K)< (P4)
(40a)
(40b)
Then, we have
Theorem 2. Under Conditions (l)-(2) of §2 and Condition (3) given above, the 
decision problem admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution (yS,T2[yS]),
g
where y is the limit of the iterative scheme (35), and T is given by (22) .
Proof. The result follows from Prop. 4 and the discussion and derivation 
that leads to Condition (3)y provided we show that the given three conditions 
subsume (33), i.e. nonnegativity of operator A. We now verify that Condition (3) 
in fact implies that A is a strongly positive operator. First note that A is
■k
2  1 2self-adjoint, because K commutes with D2iD22D21‘ Hence> using Lemma A.3 
(Appendix A), we can write down the inequality
r(A -  2 r(D21D22D21(K+K ^  + r(D12D21Pl| 1 + D21D12Pl|l)
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Then, using the line of arguments that led to (38) from (37) , and the spectral radius 
inequality for the product of two self-adjoint operators, we obtain the bound
r(ft-X) < |  r C D ^ D ^ D ^ )  r(K+K*) + r [ ( D ^ D ^ ) ] 1/2 [r(pj ^  jp ]1/2 
1 j P3 r(K+K*) + PXP2
But note that
r(K+K ) = sup [<Y, (K+K )Y>, | <Y»Y>1 J = 2 sup [<y ,Ky>, I <Y,Y>n ]
^  1 1
and since, from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality of inner products,
12 i ii iI<y,Ky >1 I 1  |<y>T>1 l |<Ky ,Ky >1 | ,
 ^ 1/2 we have r(K+K ) <_ 2 sup [<KYjKy >-i |<Y jY>-i]
Y^ri
= 2 sup [<y ,K K> |<y ,Y>J1//2 = 2 [r (K^K) ]ly^ 2 £  2p,
Yer1 1
Thus, r(A-I) £  p3p^ + p3p2 < 1,
implying that the spectrum of the self-adjoint operator A-I is uniformly in 
the unit sphere. Hence, A is strongly positive. 1=1
For the special class of strictly convex team problems (cf. §3) with 
multiple probability measures, several simplifications can be made. In this case 
eq. (31) simplifies to
•k -
Y(yl) = D22D22 {E1[E2[Y(y1)|y2] + g V p  E2 [g2 (y.,) {E1 [Y(y2)Iy£]
“ E2 [Y(y1) |y2]} £ ] }  + F2E1[x|y1] (41)
+ D12F2® fs (y 2  ^ Ix |y2J - E [x|y2]} |y^] + D^F^E2 [E2 [x | y2] | y^] ,
and in Cond'it'ion (3) inequalities (40a) are replaced by the single inequality
21
[r(D12Di2DL Di2>]1/2 =<^ 2 Di2»r P 1 Pl=P3
where p1 can be taken to be less than one. Hence, (39) reads
(2p2+p )^ < 1/ p (42)
We now summarize these results as a corollary to Thm. 2:
Corollary 3. Under Conditions (l)-(2) of §2, and (42) given above, the strictly 
convex quadratic team problem, with multiple probability measures and asymmetric 
mode of decision making, admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution
g s g
(y >T2 [y ]), where y is the limit of the iterative scheme (35) with 
*
(ZyXyp - Di2Di2[(i,i|i + - g1Cy1)E2 [82(y2)E2 [Y(y1)|y2]|y1]]>
and T2 is given by (22). □
Remark 3. When the original problem is a Stackelberg game, but the probability
measures are identical, a study of the original condition (36) reveals the inequality
& *  *
r(2) 1  r(D12D21 + " D2iD22D21) -  p < L
This is the existence condition associated with the standard stochastic Stackelberg 
game, which corroborates the earlier result obtained in [25]. D
We now conclude this section by presenting the counterpart of Corollary 2 
in the present context, which provides a set of (simpler) sufficient conditions for 
(40b) to be satisfied:
Corollary 4 . For a given pair (^»p^), the first and second inequalities of (40b) 
are satisfied if, respectively,
g1Cy1) / g2(n)P^ I (dp|6 = y ) (43a)
Y2 y2Iyl
and g1 (y )J |g2(p)|2?2 (dp | Ç = y -,) / gVb)?2 (db|y = n) (43b)
1 Y2 y2|yl Y yl|y2
2 2are uniformly bounded from above by (p^) and (p^) .
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Furthermore, if probability densities exist (with respect to the Lebesgue 
measure), these conditions can be expressed in terms of the corresponding probability
density functions (•) as follows:
2
yly2
p y / yi> / p y2(n) 2
y2 T T T  p y2 |yi(Tl|yi)dn - (p2)
p y 1 ( y i )
(n)
(44a)
p v (yp
~ r  /
py , (yi> Y2
(n)
Py (P) 
y2
y2|y (n | y^ ) dhi / 1 1 Y
p! <b>
p ,1 (b) ^yl |y2' ' '
1  H y
(b|n)db£(P/)z. 
(44b)
Proof. For (43a)-(43b) see Appendix C; (44a)-(44b), however, follow readily from 
(43a)-(43b). □
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5. Jointly Gaussian Distributions 
In decision and control theory, one appealing class of probability 
distributions is the Gaussian distribution, because it leads to tractable problems 
admitting,in most cases, closed-form solutions. Indeed when the probability 
measures of the two DMTs are identical and Gaussian, equilibrium solutions have 
been shown to be affine functions of the observations for (i) quadratic stochastic 
team problems defined on Euclidean spaces [7], (ii) quadratic stochastic Hash games 
on Euclidean spaces [8], (iii) quadratic continuous-time stochastic team problems 
[9], (iv) quadratic stochastic Stackelberg games on Euclidean spaces [25], and (v) 
quadratic continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg games [26]. In this section, we 
investigate possible extensions of this appealing structural feature to the case 
when discrepancies exist between the subjective Gaussian distributions, as 
reflected in the covariances of the random vectors (y^,y2) . We could also have 
included discrepancies in the perceptions of the mean values, but such a more 
general treatment does not contribute substantially to the qualitative nature of 
the results obtained in the sequel, and besides it makes the expressions notationally 
cumbersome. Interested reader could find relevant expressions for the nonzero mean 
case in [27].
We first introduce notation and terminology, and delineate Conditions (1) 
and (2) of §2 (§5.1). Then, we study the case of symmetric mode of decision making 
in §5.2,and show that the unique equilibrium solution of Thm. 1 is linear. Finally 
in §5.3 we treat the case of asymmetric mode of decision making, and show that (in 
contradistinction with the result of §5.2) the unique Stackelberg solution of Thm. 2 
is generically nonlinear.
5.1. Notation and Terminology
1 2Let (x,y^,y2) be zero-mean Gaussian random vectors under both P and P ,
with
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covariance (y_,y_) = Z11 2  v
,i z1
,yl yiy
,i z1
y2yl y2
> 0 , under P1^ . (45a)
Z1 Z1x xy
covariance (x,y1 ,y2) = cov(x,y) = Z1 = ( ) > 0 under P1.
Z1 z1 (45b)yx y ‘
These probability distributions clearly satisfy the absolute continuity condition 
(<Cond'it'ion (1)) of Thms. 1 and 2. Furthermore, since
g1(?) = (det ll /det Z^ )exp {-y • z -L
y i
r 1 i_1W. A ZJ - Z i = y. y.
J i  J i
(46a)
(46b)
the uniform boundedness condition (Condition (2)) of Thms. 1 and 2 is satisfied 
whenever
W. > 0 , i=l,2. (47)
After making these observations, let us introduce the additional notation
- 1
N. A M'] . -  M-? .B. 'Sf!  . -  Z1 i = n  ijj ji yi
B . M . . + W. J = 33 J
(48a)
(48b)
M1 M1 
11 12
M1 M1 .
21 z2
z z
yl yly2
Z j1
y2yi y2
- i T
q1 A [det Z1 .det Z^ t /det Z^ .det B^.det Z^]in 1/2
yi y j '  y 5 J Y '
(48c)
(48d)
in terms of which we evaluate (21a) [using standard properties of Gaussian 
distributions] to be
1
g1 (y i ) E ^ g h y p l y p  = q1 exp { - j  y p ^ } (49)
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We are now in a position to specialize the results of Thms. 1 and 2 to Gaussian 
distributions and obtain some explicit results.
5.2. Symmetric Mode of Decision Making
In order to apply Thm. 1 to the Gaussian decision problem formulated above, 
we first explore the satisfaction of various conditions given there. We have already 
shown above that Condition (1) is always satisfied and Condition (2) is satisfied 
whenever W^ > 0. For the remaining condition we study inequalities (20b). The second 
of these is satisfied, for a given p^, if (using (21a)) expression (49) is uniformly 
bounded in y_^ , and this bound is no greater than p^. For uniform boundedness of (49) 
it is necessary and sufficient that
N. > 0
l  -
under which the latter condition becomes
i , iv2
q < (p2)
Hence going back to (20a), the condition
(50a)
-î 2  2^
D..D.J. < 1/q , for at least one i=l,2,i] Ji i (50b)
becomes sufficient for (19). We are now in a position to state and prove the 
following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let (47) hold for i=l,2, and (50a)-(50b) hold for at least one i. Then, 
the quadratic Gaussian decision problem formulated in this section admits a unique 
stable Nash equilibrium solution where u? = y?(y^) are linear in y^, and are
given by
i=l,2. (51)y . (y. ) = L . y .
l i
m.
Here L * H  1 -> U1 are bounded linear operators, constituting the unique 
’ i *
solution to the linear operator equations
-1 . ,-l
L y - D1 .D~! .L. E3 E3 E1 E1 y. iyi i] J H  YjTj Yj y^y± yi 1 (52)
-  D ^ . F ^ E 3
. - 1  . . - 1 • • . " Ii i i m ,
y± ^i^xy.^y. yi = 0 , ¥y.£H , i=l,2.
i j  J X y j  y j  y j Y i
y.  ■'l l
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Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution follows from Thm. 1, Corollary 2,
and the discussion that precedes the statement of the theorem. The linearity of this
unique solution, on the other hand, follows by noting that if the pair ( y ^ ^ y ^ 0 )^ is
taken to be linear in (y-py^ in (14), all the terms of the sequence are linear, and
hence the limit (which exists as already proven) is linear. Hence, choosing y. as in
m.
(51), where : ]R -* IL are bounded linear operators, substituting this into (14)
m.
and requiring it to hold for all y^e]R (since all probability measures are Gaussian), 
leads to the unique relations (52). □
Remark 4 . Thm. 3 above extends the result of Thm. 2 of [8] on quadratic Gaussian 
games to the case when a common probability space does not exist and the decision 
spaces are not necessarily finite dimensional, and shows that the appealing linear 
structure prevails when there exists a discrepancy in the perceptions of the two DM’s 
of the underlying probability measures. The existence and uniqueness conditions here 
are, however, more restrictive than those of [8], and also involve the probabilistic 
structure (see (50b)). Expression (21a) in the most general case (and (49) for the 
special Gaussian case) is not uniformly (in y1) bounded by 1, unless g1(y^)=g~*(y.)=1
i "I
a.e. P and P (which corresponds to the case of equivalent probability measures), 
y i  Y J
since R-N derivatives (if different from 1) will be both smaller and larger than unity
on sets of nonzero measure. This then implies, in view of (47), and from (49), that 
q1 > 1, i=l,2, with the inequality being strict if P1 is not equivalent to P^ for at
yi y ±
least one i=l,2, j^i. In such a case, even team problems, a stable equilibrium solution
may not exist, particularly if l/q. < IlD^ .D'l.ll? < 1 for at least one i=l,2: i^i
l  i j  J 1  1  J
This indicates, in general, the presence of a strong coupling between probabilistic and 
deterministic elements of the problem in terms of existence conditions. However, if 
the discrepancy between perceptions of the DM's on the probability measures (measured 
in terms of R-N derivatives) is sufficiently small, one would expect q^ to be sufficiently 
close to unity, which ensures satisfaction of condition (50c) for a fairly general
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class of quadratic strictly convex Gaussian team problems (since, IlD^.D^JI. = IID“? . I
i j  j i  1  ] i  i ]  j
p < 1, for such team problems). For further discussion on this point we refer the 
reader to [10]. □
In the statement of Thm. 1, the condition (47) places some severe restrictions
on the second moments of the underlying distributions (in case a discrepancy exists),
which may however be relaxed if we are willing to consider equilibrium policies in a
more restricted space. More specifically, satisfaction of (47) ensures that regardless
of what initial set of policies the DM’s start the infinite recursion (15) with, every
element of this series is well-defined, and under (50a)-(50b) it will converge to a
unique limit which is linear; in other words, even if the DM's start with nonlinear
policies, the end result will be a linear equilibrium solution. The condition (47) is
restrictive, because we require (without imposing any constraints on the policy spaces)
the series generated by (15) to be well-defined even with nonlinear starting conditions.
However, if we restrict the team agents to linear policies from the outset, under
Gaussian distributions (and following the argument used in the proof of Thm. 1) elements
of the series (15) will be well-defined (without requiring (47)) and will converge to
the equilibrium solution provided that (50a)-(50b) hold for at least one i=l,2. This
line of reasoning then leads to the following result which we give without a proof.
Proposition 5 . Let r be the class of all linear policies in the form (51), with
m .i i a s.: ]R ■* U a bounded linear operator, i=l,2. On x the statement of Thm. 1
is valid even if (47) does not hold true. □
We now interpret these results in the context of two examples one of which
is a scalar team problem and the other one is a continuous-time team problem, both
with multiple subjective Gaussian probabilities.
Example 1. Consider a family of scalar Gaussian team problems, with 
°22 = D11 = 1’ D12 = D21 = d' 1^ 1 < 1> Fi = f!» = f2» n=m1=m2=lJ and
b
2  2, r\ab>e , pab>c . (53)
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To investigate the applicability of Thm. 1 to this class of problems, let us first 
observe that condition (.47) is satisfied if, and only if, both
0<y<l , 0<n<l . (54)
For condition (50a), we evaluate N_^  and require it to be nonnegative for either i=l, 
or i=2:
N = (\iab-c2)Cl-\ i)[va2- c 2-( l-\i)ab]/{a[\i2a2- ( l - \ i ) ( w b - c 2) ] } > 0 (55a)
or
N2 = (r\db-e2) (1-n) [r\b2-e2- (l-r\)ah ] / {b [n b -(1-ft) ,{r\ab-e )]} 0 , (55b)
Finally, condition (50b) dictates either
va2\d\2< n[y2a2-(l-y)(ya&-e2)] (56a)
or
r\b2\d\2< y [r2b2-(l-ri) (r\ab-e2)] (56b)
provided that the terms on the right-hand-side are positive (if not, then the
inequalities will accordingly change direction).
The set of values for a,2?,c,e,y,n that satisfy (54)-(56) is clearly not
empty. To gain some further insight into these conditions, let us consider 
the class of team decision problems in which the discrepancies between the DMs’ 
perceptions of the variances of different Gaussian random variables is relatively 
small, that is there exist sufficiently small e^>0 and such that y=l-e ,
r)=l-£^ y and furthermore e-e, and \a\ is considerably smaller than both cl and 
b. Note that, when £^ =£^ =0, conditions (54)-(56) are all satisfied (note that 
|d|<l because of strict convexity of the objective functional) regardless of 
the relative magnitudes of e and o. Hence, when the discrepancy is only in the 
perceptions of the correlation between y^ and y^, the scalar quadratic Gaussian 
team problem always admits a stable equilibrium solution. Now, for nonzero, 
but positive,and sufficiently small e^, the dominating term in (55a) is
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N1 ~ e1(y^-c2) (ya2-c2)/y2a^
which is positive, in view of (53) and the initial hypothesis that \ a / o \ » l .
Likewise, is positive whenever 0<e2<<l and \ b / e \ » l . Furthermore, given 
a d, 0<d<l, we can always find and e2, both in (0,1), so that both (56a) 
and (56b) are satisfied whenever |<i|<d. Hence, the conclusion is that when the 
deviations of the perceptions of the DM's from the common Gaussian probability 
measures are incremental (and satisfying (54)), the linear equilibrium solution 
of the Gaussian scalar team problem retains its stability property (but, of course, 
at a different (possibly close, in norm) equilibrium point). □
Example 2. As a second illustration of Thm. 1, for infinite-dimensional decision spaces, 
we consider here a class of stochastic Gaussian team problems defined in continuous time. 
More specifically, let U^=U2=C2(0,T), the Hilbert space of all scalar-valued Lebesgue- 
integrable functions on the bounded interval [0,T], endowed with the standard inner
product /Tu(t)v(t)dt, for u,v€£ Furthermore, let Y and Y = ]R, and the Gaussian
0  2  1  statistics have zero mean, and variances be as given in (53). Let D-^ = D22 = I,
1  2 *the identity operator on and D12 = D21 be the Fredholm operator
1  TD ? u = / K(t,s)u(s)ds (57)
0
where K(t,s) is a continuous kernel on 0<t,s<T, and finally let F^ = f.(t),
i=l,2, which are continuous functions on [0,T].
Now, conditions (47a) and (50a) depend only on the probabilistic structure,
and are therefore again given by (54) and (55), respectively. For (50b), however, we
i 12have to obtain the counterpart of (56), by simply replacing \d\ with the norm of the
*  *
1 1  1 1
operators D2.2D12 anc* D12D12* resPect:*-vely • Since
*
1 *  TD _ u = / K(s,t)u(s)ds, 
0
the self-adjoint operator D
12^12
is given by
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* tt  t
üÎLdÎL U = // K(t,T)K(s,T)uCs)ds dt = / Z(t,s)u(s)ds,
12 12 00 o
where Z(t,s) j K (t>T)K (SjX) dx. (58a)
TT
Let A = {//|Z(t ,s) | ^ dtds}^^. 
00
(58b)
& T T T T  T
Then,  Il u|ll  = £ I / K { t  , s ) u ( s ) d s  | 2d t  £  J [ / | z ( t  , s )  | 2ds] [ / | u ( s )  | 2d s ] d t  = A2 II ull 2
0 0 0
where the second step follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Hence,
*
iidL dL"i ^ x ’
*
and because of symmetry is also bounded in norm by the same quantity.
This then leads to the following counterpart of (56) : A sufficient condition
for satisfaction of (50b) is either
ya2A < n [y2a2-(l-y) (ya£>-c2) ] (59a)
or
r } b ^ \  <  y [r|2£>2-(l-n) (qa^-e2) ] (59b)
provided that the terms on the right-hand-side are positive, where A is defined 
by (58a)-(58b).
Hence, under (54) and either (55a) and (59a) or (55b) and (59b) , 
the continuous—time static decision problem formulated above admits a unique 
stable equilibrium solution, and this solution is given by (from Thm. 3):
Y°(t,y.) = kjL(t)yi , i=l,2, (60)
where k^t) are continuous functions on [0,T], satisfying
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e c  T  2  Tr 1
kl(t) " P P  f x(t’s)k1(s)ds - c°xy e/ab) / K(t,s)f1(s)ds - (a^  /a)f1(t)=0 (61a)
eo Tr i T 9
k2(t) “ P P  f ^(s,t)k2(s)ds - (cr^c/ob) / K(s,t)f2(s)ds - (cT^ /b)f'2(t)-0. (61b)
Note that k±(t) above stands for operator L± in (52), and we have already shown 
that a unique solution to both (61a) and (61b) exist in [0,T], under (54) and 
either (55a) and (59a) or (55b) and (59b), and this solution is also continuous.
Finally, if our interest lies only in the existence of a unique linear 
equilibrium solution (not necessarily stable), the required condition is unique 
solvability of the integral equations (61a)-(61b), for which a sufficient condition 
is [6]
(ec/ab) X < 1
where X is defined by (58b). D
5.3. Asymmetric Mode of Decision Making
To obtain the counterpart of the results of §5.2 under the asymmetric mode 
of decision making, we first investigate the possibility for the unique solution of 
Thm. 2 to be linear. Towards this end we first observe that the decision problem will 
admit a unique linear solution if, and only if, equation (31) is satisfied by the 
decision rule
yCy-i^ ) = aYx  ^ '
mlfor some linear bounded operator A: E. Hence, using (31), A should be
the solution of (by pulling A out of the conditional expectations)
(63a)
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Since the random variables are jointly Gaussian under both measures,
E ' [ykI y^] ~ ^k£y& ’ : (63b)
El[xlyl] = SM y£ i,£=l,2 , (63c)
for some matrices S and . In view of this, (63a) can be rewritten askic Oio
Ayl " ('D12D21AS12S21 + F1S01 + D12F2S02S21)yl + ^D21®12AS12 D21D22D21 1.
/V
+ D21F2S02 D21D22F2S02^ 8 ^yP E
(64)
This then leads to the following Proposition:
1 2Proposition 6. Let (47) and Condition (3) be satisfied, and either P ^ P or
1 , 2 P + P Then, the quadratic Gaussian decision problem with asymmetric mode of
decision making admits a linear (Stackelberg) equilibrium solution if, and only if,
m„
(i) there exists a bounded linear operator A: ]R -> satisfying
and
1 2  2 1  1 1  1 2 2 1  
A “ D12D21AS12S21 + F1S01 + D12F2S02S21
(ii) this solution also satisfies
(65a)
k k k k k
2 1 1 2 1 2  2 2 1 1  2 1 2 2
D21D12AS12 - D21D22D21AS12 + D21F2S02 " D21D22F2S02 = (65b)
Proof. Since the "if" part is obvious in view of Thm. 2, we verify only 
the "only if" part of the proposition. [In what follows we adopt the notation 
S >_ 0 to imply that the nonnegative definite matrix S has at least one 
positive eigenvalue.] The proof proceeds by showing for three exclusive
1 2 2 i(and exhaustive) cases that f(y^) = g (y^)E [g (y2^y2'yl^  is a non -^^ near function of y^ 
(a) P2 =P1 , and P1 ^P2 .
y2 y2 yX yl
2 1 i
Here, g (y2)=l, and g (y1)=c;L exp {- -  y ^ W ^ } ,  where W _> 0, and
1 2c^ > 0 is a constant. Hence, f(y^) = g (y^) S^y^ which is nonlinear since W > 0.
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(b> p2 ¿p,1, , p,1, =p2
y2 y2 yl yl
1 2 1
Here, g ( y ^ l ,  and g Cy2)=c2 exp Y  y2W2y2^’ where W2 -  °’ and c2 > 0 
is a constant. In this case, f can be evaluated to be
f(yx) = c(V+W2)_1 VS2^  exp {- y'By^ 
where V = E2{(y2 - S ^ y p  (y2 “ s2lyp
B = S^-VS^ - S2£V'(V+W2)_1VS21 > 0,
and c is a constant. Since 0, B has at least one positive eigenvalue,
and hence f(y^) is again nonlinear in y^. 
(c) p2 jip1 and P1 ?*p2y2 y2 yl yl
In this case, following the same lines as above, we find
f (y-j^) = c(V+W2) 1 VS21y1 exp {- j y'CB-W^y^
which is nonlinear since both B >_ 0, >_ 0.
Hence, in view of the preceding analysis, a necessary condition 
for existence of a solution to (64) is that the last term should vanish 
(i.e. (65b)) for an A that solves (65a) . a
Remark 5. A sufficient condition for (65a) to admit a unique solution in the Banach
mlspace of linear bounded operators mapping H  into is
r(D12D2iD2iDi2) Tr {S12S21S21S12} < 1 
which is clearly satisfied under Condition (3).
The conditions of Prop. 6 are clearly non-void; because, given the unique
1 2  1 2solution of (65a), it may be possible to find F2, F2, S q 2  and S q 2  s o  that (65b) is
satisfied. However, it should also be clear that satisfaction of (65b) places some
severe restrictions on the parameters of the problem, which in general will not be met.
1 2  1 2Hence, it is fair to say that, if either P or P £P , generically the problem
Y1 yl y2 y2
does not admit a linear equilibrium solution, even if it is a team problem; that is:
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--or-° 1-lary 5 ‘ If either P or P (or both) , the quadratic Gaussian decision
yl yl y2 y2
problem does not admit (generically) a linear Stackelberg equilibrium solution. The 
unique solution, which exists under (47) and Condition (3), is nonlinear. □
The conditions of the preceding Corollary involve only the marginal 
distributions of y^ and in the compliment of these conditions we can derive the
following linear solution:
1 2Proposition 7. For the quadratic Gaussian decision problem, let both P =P and
yl yl1 2  1 2  1 2P =P (but not necessarily P =P , and even P =P
--------------  yly2X yly2Xyl y2
1 2 2* 1* 1/2 2* 1 2 1/2 
2 D^12D21D21D12^ + Ir CD2iD22D21^ < 1
yly2 yxy2)• Then, if
(66)
the problem admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution for DM1 (the
leader) which is linear in y,:J1
Yi(yi) = Ayi (67a)
m.
where A: E. -> is the unique bounded linear operator solving
ik ÿc
Ay = (pF D2 AS2 SF + D2 DF ASF S2 - D2 DF D2 AS2 S2 + FFSF + DF F2S2 qF yl U^12 21Ab12b21 + D21D12AS12S21 21 22D21Ab12S21 + F1S01 + D12F2S02S21
m.* *
+ D21F2S02S21 _ D21D22F2S02S21)yl ’ ¥ylS;R 1
(67b)
and sk£ are defined hy (31b)-(31c) , and is defined by E1[x|yi] = Sq±Y±
1 2  1 2  1 2
Proof. When P =P and P =P , g (y..)=g (y9)=l and hence Conditions (1) and (2) of 
yl y2 y2 y2
Thm. 2 are always satisfied, and in Condition (3), p =p =1. Then, (66) is the counter­
part of (39), and hence existence and uniqueness follow from Thm. 2. Linearity, on the
other hand, follows by noting that if we start iteration (35) with y(°)=0, since 
1 2
g (y1)=g (y2)=1 every term will be linear in y (see also (64)), and hence the limit 
(which exists by Thm. 2) will be linear. Then, substituting yF(y^)=Ay^ in (31), we 
obtain (67b), by simply letting g1(.y1)=g2(y2)=l in (64). □
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When there is a discrepancy between the DM’s perceptions of the variances 
of either or y^, Prop. 7 will not hold, and the problem will admit Cgenerically) a 
nonlinear equilibrium solution, as proven earlier in Prop. 6 and Corollary 5. In this 
case, an explicit closed-form solution cannot be obtained; however, an approximate 
solution can be derived by using the iteration (35) which, for the Gaussian problem, 
becomes
(k+1) - r>2 r-1 Tr-2 i- (k) * >v 2 1 1
Y ' ( y p  -  d12d 2 1 e [e [Y k ' ( y p l y p l y p  + D ^ D ^ g h y p
• E2 t S2 ( y2) E1 [ Y( k ) ( y p | y 2 ] | y 1 ] -  D ^ D ^ g h y  )
.2r 2, ,„2, Ck) 1„1• E‘-[g‘ (y2)E‘ [Yw C y p | y 2] | y p  +  ( F j s ^  + Di2F2S02S21)yl 
+ (D21F2S02 -  ■
(68)
If we start this iteration with y^^(y^)=0, or any linear function of y , at
every iteration we obtain linear combinations of terms of the type A^^ y  an(j
B y^ exp {- —  y^V^ ^y^}, where A^ ^  and are linear operators, and
(k)V >0 is an m^xm^ matrix. Since this is a successive approximation technique 
under Condition (3), even stopping the iteration after a finite number of terms
will provide a solution sufficiently close to the unique optimum. Hence, generically^ 
a suboptimal policy for DM1, which is sufficiently close to the unique solution of 
(31), will be of the form
< v  ■ *
£<N
*00 r 1 .tt(£) ,B y± exp {- -  YjV Jy±}
where N is a sufficiently large integer (related to the number of iterations 
taken in (68)), and A^N\  B ^ \  are generated via the iteration (68). Note
that as N-*° this solution will uniformly converge to the unique optimum.
Yet another suboptimal solution can be obtained by restricting DM1Ts 
policies, at the outset, to linear functions of y , i.e. to the form (62) 
where A is a variable linear operator. DM2’s response to any such policy will
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also be linear (in 3^)> thus making T  ^ in (10) a linear operator. Then, the
problem faced by DM1 is minimization of (11), with y(y^)=Ay^, over all linear
bounded operators A. The solution of this minimization problem will provide
DM1 with a linear policy that is (in general) inferior to the limiting solution of
1 2(68), unless, of course, g (y^)=g (y2)=l in which case the two solutions will 
be the same (satisfying (67b)). We do not pursue here the details of the 
derivation of the best linear solution for the general case (as outlined 
above).
Furthermore, it is possible to work out the various conditions for the special 
cases of the scalar and continuous-time team problems (formulated as in Examples 1 and 
2) and write down the equilibrium solution explicitly whenever it is linear. Such an 
analysis would routinely follow the lines of the discussion of Examples 1 and 2, and 
hence will not be included here mainly because of space limitations.
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6. Discussion of Possible Extensions, and Concluding Remarks
In the preceding sections, we have developed an equilibrium theory for two- 
person quadratic decision problems with static information patterns, wherein the 
decision makers (DM's) do not necessarily have the same perception of the underlying 
probability space; that is, our formulation allows for discrepancies in the way 
different DM’s perceive the probability space. As indicated earlier, when such 
discrepancies exist, even team problems have to be analyzed in the framework of 
nonzero-sum stochastic games, and in such a framework the Nash solution concept is the 
most suitable equilibrium concept if the DM’s occupy symmetric (non-hierarchical) 
positions in the decision process, and the Stackelberg solution concept becomes more 
meaningful if there is a hierarcy in decision making.
Section 3 of the paper has provided a set of sufficient conditions for 
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric mode of decision 
making, with the additional feature that it be stable. This is an appealing feature 
of the solution because, in order to arrive at equilibrium (as a consequence of an 
infinite number of response iterations), each DM does not have to know the subjective 
probability measures perceived by the other DM, but has to know only the policy adopted 
by the other DM at the most recent step of the iteration.
In Section 4 we have presented a counterpart of the results of §3 under the 
asymmetric mode of decision making. The conditions derived ensure that the equilibrium 
policy of the leader can be obtained as the limit of an infinite sequence which 
involves conditional expectations under two different probability measures. This 
sequence [(35),(27)] is structurally different from its counterpart in §3 (see 14), 
even for team problems, and it contains R-N derivatives of the two probability 
measures as multiplying factors (which are absent in (14)).
In Section 5 we have shown that when the underlying probability distributions 
belong to a Gaussian class, the Nash equilibrium solution will be linear (affine, if 
mean values are nonzero) in the available static measurements, with the gain operator
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satisfying a Lyapunov-type operator equation (cf. Thm. 3). This solution and the 
associated existence conditions have been studied further in the context of two 
examples which involve scalar and continuous-time stochastic team problems with 
multiple probability models. In developing a counterpart of Thm. 3 for asymmetric 
mode of decision making, we have arrived at a seemingly surprising (unexpected) result —  
the unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution being generically nonlinear in the 
measurements (even under Gaussian multiple probability measures). This constitutes 
the first unique nonlinear solution reported in the literature for a quadratic Gaussian 
static game or team problem? It should be noted that we have not given a closed-form 
expression for this nonlinear solution, but have instead provided a recursive scheme 
which generates admissible policies that come arbitrarily close to the optimum solution.
Several extensions of the results presented in this paper seem to be possible. 
Firstly, we should note that the general Hilbert-space framework adopted in this paper 
and the general solutions presented for the Gaussian problems in Section 5 (Thms. 3 
and 4) apply to other models also, such as the ones similar to the continuous-time team 
problem treated in [9] and the Stackelberg problem of [26], but with the DM’s having 
different probability models. It is expected that some explicit results (closed-form 
solutions) can also be obtained in these cases, but this point has not been pursued in 
this paper and is left for future research.
Another possible extension of the results of this paper would be to the class 
of problems in which the random state of nature (i.e. x) as well as the measurements 
(y^) are stochastic processes. The general theories of Sections 3 and 4 could easily 
be extended so as to encompass this class of problems also, provided that the problem 
is set up under the right mathematical assumptions. In particular, if the random
iReference [12] also reports on existence of nonlinear (Nash) solutions for 
quadratic Gaussian nonzero-sum games, but there the nonlinear solution is one of many 
solutions one of which is linear, and is due to nonunique intersection of reaction 
functions (which disappears under appropriate conditions).
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variables are taken to be Hilbert space valued weak random variables, with the inner 
product satisfying some continuity and boundedness conditions [11], Thms. 1-4 directly 
apply to this more general class of decision problems, when interpreted in the right 
framework. Furthermore, extensions to dynamic (multi-stage) problems is also possible, 
by adopting the framework of (say) [8] for the linear-quadratic-Gaussian problem. Then, 
the unique Nash equilibrium solution under the one-step-delay observation sharing 
pattern can be obtained by basically following the approach of [8] and utilizing in the 
recursive derivation Thm. 3 of this paper instead of Thm. 2 of [8]. Details of this 
derivation are, however, rather involved, and will be reported elsewhere.
Regarding the Nash equilibrium solution, yet another possible extension would 
be to multiple decision-maker problems with more than two (say, N) DM’s. Even though 
the definition of Nash equilibrium (cf. Def. 1) admits a natural (unique) extension to 
such problems, that of stable equilibrium (cf. Def. 2) does not extend in a unique way. 
One viable alternative is to assume that each DM reacts optimally to the set of most 
recent policies of all the other DM’s, which leads to a set of N relations similar to 
(9). In this case, (12) will be replaced by N equations with the right-hand-side 
expressions involving N-l policies of different DM’s. However, the line of reasoning 
that took us from (13) to (14) does not have a counterpart if N>2, and in general it 
is not possible to obtain N recursion relations each of which involves only one DM’s 
policies at consecutive stages. Then, the counterpart of (13) will have to be treated 
as a "multi-valued" operator equation, in which context an existence and uniqueness 
result will have to be established. This seems to be a challenging problem whose 
solution requires somewhat different mathematical techniques than the ones employed in 
this paper.
One source of motivation for the research reported in this paper has been 
(as discussed in Section 1) the desire to investigate the sensitivity and robustness 
of team-optimal solutions (in stochastic teams) to independent variations in the 
perceptions of the DM’s of the underlying probability space (and, in particular, the
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probability measure). The analysis of this paper indeed provides a framework for 
such a study when the roles of the DM's are either symmetric or asymmetric, since an 
equilibrium theory has been established in both cases within an "e-neighborhood" of 
the team-optimal solution. Some further work is needed in order to determine the 
"satisfiability" of the several existence conditions obtained in the paper when the 
region of interest is an e-neighborhood of a common probability space, and to further 
extend the analysis to an investigation of sensitivity and robustness properties of 
team solutions (obtained under the stipulation of existence of a common underlying 
probability space) in this e-neighborhood.
An aspect of the decision problem studied here, which is worth bringing forth, 
is that the subjective probability measures perceived by each DM is fixed in advance 
and the DM’s do not attempt to change their subjective priors during the course of the 
decision process. Hence, in this sense, the problem treated here is categorically 
different from the class of problems treated in [18]-[21], where the objective was for 
the DM’s to arrive at a common (consistent) set of probabilistic descriptions of the 
unknown variables. In the symmetric mode, there is, however, an implicit learning 
process built in the recursive process that leads to the stable equilibrium decision 
rules for each DM, since the DM’s do not necessarily have access to each other's 
perception of the priors.
Yet another aspect of the problem treated in this paper is that the general 
formulation could be viewed as a multi-modeling in multiple-decision maker problems; 
however, as opposed to the singular perturbations approach of [22]-[24], here the 
multi-modeling is in the probabilistic description of the decision problem, with each 
DM having a different probabilistic model of the "rest of the world."
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Appendix A
In this appendix we state a number of results concerning the spectral 
radii of linear bounded operators.
Let A: T+T and B: T-*T be two linear bounded operators where V is 
a Hilbert space equipped with the inner product <•>. Then the spectral radius 
of A is defined by
r(A) = lim sup [<<A >>] 
k-*»
(A-l)
where <<A>> is the norm of A, given by
1/2<<A>> = sup [<Ay,Ay> / <y,y>] . (A-2)
y€r
For self-adjoint operators there is an equivalence between the spectral 
radius and norm of an operator; specifically, if A is self-adjoint,
r(A) = <<A>> = sup{j<y,Ay>|/<y,y>) (A-3)
[see[l3]5p. 514]. However, for operators which are not self-adjoint, such 
an equivalence does not exist, and one can only provide bounds on r(A):
Lemma A.l,
For any linear bounded operator A,
* I/?r(A) < <<A>> = [r(A A)]
k i i kProof. Since A belongs to a Banach algebra, <<A >> < <<A>>| and hence
r(A) <_ lim sup { I <<A>> I ^ = <<A>:
k-x»
Furthermore, <<A>> . sup [<Y ,AAAy>/<Y ,Y>]1/2
* 1/2 *which is [r(A A)] by (A-3) because A A is self-adjoint.
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Lemma A.2. Let A and B be two linear bounded operators which commute. Then,
(i) r (AB + A B ) _< 2 [r (AA~) r (B~B) ] =  2 [r (A* A) r (BB*) ]
(ii) r(AB) < r(A)r(B)
Proof. (i) Since AB + A B is self-adjoint, using (A-3)
r (AB + A*B*) = sup(|<y,(AB + A*B*) Y> | / <y ,Y> } = 2 sup{|<a Y ,B*y >|/<Y,Y> }
Y^r Y^r
where the equality has followed since A and B commute. Using Cauchy-Schwarz [3]
inequality, this expression can be bounded from above by
1  2 sun rl<AY,AY>l1/2l<B'\,B"Y>|x/z' ,
Y^r1 <Y >Y>
and performing individual supremization we further obtain the bound
1/2
2 sup 
Y^r
1/2
|<Ay ,Ay > 1 1/2 sup ’l<B*Y.B*Y>r
<Y,y> yGr <Y,y >
_
* * * ,1/2
= 2 <<A>> <<B >> = 2[r(A A)r(BB )]
where the last line has followed from Lemma A.l. Note that this expression can
■ji ^ A *
be written in different ways because r(A A) = r(AA ) , r(BB ) = r(B B).
(ii) Firstly note that
r(AB) = lim sup [<<(AB)^>>]^^ = lim sup [<<A^B^>>]^^ (*)
k-x» k-*»
where the last equality has followed because A and B commute. Now, since A,B belong
1c k. 1c 1cto a Banach algebra, <<A B >> < <<A >> <<B >> for every k <=>
r Ak k t 1/k r Ak _k , 1/k r Ak , 1/k r _,k , 1/k r ,<=> [<<A B >>] < [<<A >> <<B >>] = [<<A >>] [<<B >>] for every k
and taking lim sup of both sides, and using (*)
r(AB) < lim sup {[<<A^>>]^^ [<<B^>>]^^ < r(A)r(B)
k-*»
which proves the desired result.
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Lemma A.3. Let A and B be both self-adjoint. Then,
r(A + B) < r(A) + r(B)
Proof. This follows from (A-3) and the triangle inequality applied to norm <<•>>. □
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us first recall the following result from functional analysis (see, for 
example [13, Chapter XIII, Theorem 3]).
Lemma B.l. Let $ be a linear bounded operator mapping a Hilbert space Y into itself, 
and consider the equation
y = + y
defined on T. Furthermore, consider the "successive approximation"
, k=0,1,...(k+1) , e (k)Y = y + 5y
(B-l)
(B-2)
to the solution of (B-l). Then, the sequence generated by (B-2) converges to a 
unique element of T, for any starting point Y ^ eF, which is further a solution of 
(B-l), if, and only if, the spectral radius of 5 is less than unity, i.e. there 
exists a p, 0<p<l, such that
r(£) < p . (B-3)
□
Now, applying this Lemma to our problem, we identify $ with either or
(given by (16)), Y with Y^ or Y the successive approximation (B-2) with (14), and 
condition (B-3) above with (19) for either i=l or 2. Then, the statement of 
Thm. 1 (i) readily follows from the preceding Lemma, in view of Prop. 2.
Furthermore, since can be written as the product of two commuting 
operators, using Lemma A.2(ii) we obtain
V * i >  = V DlpiU> <
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Under (20a) this can be bounded from above by = p1 < 1» thereby ensuring (19).
On the other hand, since the spectral radius of a bounded linear operator is bounded 
from above by its norm [13], and that | D1) ^  = « D 1» ^  because D1 also maps U_^  into JJ 
(in addition to being a mapping from T into itself), (20b) follows. This completes 
the proof of Thm. 1. □
Appendix C
1. Proof of Corollary 2 (Section 3)
Here we verify that the second inequality of (20b) is implied by the 
condition that (21a) is uniformly bounded by p^. Towards this end, we first have, 
for each from the Cauchy-Buniakowski (Schwarz) inequality [3] applied to F^:^
= 11/ pv Iv Wnlyp/ Y(5)P^ |v (ds|n)|N 1/ Y(C)P^ . (d?|n)||*
1 Yj j 1 Yi 1 j Y± 1 j
= / (/ y (£)p^ (d5|n) » / y (5)p^ i (dc|n)). P-* (dn)gj (n)
Y. Y. yi Y. yi |yi yi3 i i
where the last equality has involved a change of measures, using the R-N derivative 
gJ (n). Now, again using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, this expression can be bounded 
from above by
< / / (y(S) » (y (O) I (dC | n) (u)p^ (dp)
Y.Y. yi |yj yiJ i
= / (y (0 ,(y (0 ),p ^ v f ( d n | O g j (p)
Y. yi yj Y . yj 1 yii J J
where the last equality has followed from Bayes Theorem, It now readily follows that 
under the condition of Corollary 2, the last expression is bounded from above by 
1 P jl yI \y thus proving the desired result for i=l,2. □
2. Proof of Corollary 4 (Section 4)
2The fact that uniform boundedness of (43a) (by (P2) ) implies the first 
inequality of (40b) follows readily from the proof given above, since the spectral
J.
In the following we have abused the notation and have used I • I i to stand also for 
the natural norm derived from <•,•>■£; but this should not create any source of 
confusion.
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radius of 11 ^l|l ec^ ua^ to t i^e scluare of the norm of P^|^. Now, to verify that 
uniform boundedness of (43b) implies the second inequality of (40b) we follow basically 
the same line of reasoning, but the details of the proof are more involved. Towards 
this end we first note that for each y€r^,
llKyll? = 1 g1 (5) / p ? | (dn |y - ,=O g2 (n) / p
y 2 y2'yi Y ± yi* y2
(db I y 2=n) Y (b) I x 
y  g1 (5) / P2 1 ( d n | y = c ) g 2 (n) / P2 , (d b|y ,= n)Y (b) « 2
Y2 y 2 y l Y, yl'y2
111/g1(5)g2(n) / p 2 | (db|y2=n)y(b)l2
Yx yl 'y2
where the second equality follows from a change of measures, and the last bound 
follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. It should be pointed out that
here we have abused the notation and have used to mean
fni(£,ri)IL = {/ / (m(C , n) ,m(£, n) X, P^ „T ( d £ x d q ) j1/2
Z Y Y 1 2 1 yly2
where m is a (y^,}^) - measurable random variable taking values in U^; hence, the
sub-index "2" indicates that the probability space is the one determined by 
the subjective probability measure of DM2.
Now, the latter bound can further be bounded above by
£  / / g1(C)|g2(n)|2P2 (d£xdn) /  P2 , (db|y. - n )  (r(b) ,Y(b))
Y1Y2 yly2 Y yl |y2 1
since (i)
(/ P^ (db|y2=n)y(b) , / P^ i (db|y =n)y(b))
Y1 yly2 Yx yl ly2 Z
1 I |v (db|y2=q)(y(b),y(b))
Y. yl'y2 1
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by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (because P i is also a probability
yl'y21 2  2measure), and (ii) g ( O |g (n)| il 0* Hence, by interchanging the variables 
£ and b,
IlKy I ? 1  / / / (y (£) *Y (£))-, g1^) I g2(n) I 2P2 (dbxdq)P2 . (dq|y=Ç)P2 (dÇ)
1 Y!Y2Yi 7x72 y2Iyl X yl
P2 (dn) 
y2
and under (43b) this can be bounded above by
1  / p i  ( d O C Y C O . y C O ) ,  p ? = p ? M ?
Y  Y l  X H H X
1
which completes the proof.
Appendix D
1. Derivation of First and Second Gateaux Variations [(25)—(26)]
Starting with the expression for J as given by (23) , we first obtain
AJ(y;h) = J(y+h) - J(y)
= F  <h»Y>i + T <Y,h>1 + - <h,h>.
+  J  J  {(F?E2 [x
Y z 2
y 2 ] +  D 2 1E 2 tY(y1 )|y2 ], E 2 [h(y i ) |y2 ])2
+  (D21E 2 [h(y1 )
___ __ ________ J ---- — -----
y 2 l> D 22F 2 E 2 tx ly2 ] +  D 22D 21 tY(y^)
.1- j-
|y2 ])2
+  (D2 1E 2 [h(y1) y 2 1 ’ D 22D 21E 2 t h ( y l) ly 2 ])2 } Py . (dÇ)
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= 6J(y;h) + 62J(y;h) .
Now, since 6j(y;h) is homogeneous of degree one, and 6 J(y;h) is homogeneous of degree 
two, AJ(y;h) admits a unique decomposition with the corresponding expressions being 
(after some simplification)
6J(y;h) = <hyy>± + / (E2Ih(y^)|y2], D21D22{F2e 2[x Iy2]
Y2
+ D21E2 [y(y1)|y2] » 1 P* (d£) - <h,EX[FPx|y^ > ±
2* 1
- / (e z [h(y 1> | y2], D21F2x)1 p (dx»Yr d )^
XxY _
(D-l)
- <h»D12D21i>l + D12F2E E^ I y2^  I yi^  >i <Pl|lh » D21D12Y>1
1 „2 1r 2 * * 2 1
52J(y;h) = | ch.h^ + | /  (E2 [h(y1> | y2],
Y2 (D-2)
•E2 [h(y1)|y2])1 pJ <«) - <h,D^2D21P1 |1h>1
where we have used some properties of adjoint operators under inner products,
and the notation introduced in (28); we have also made use of the fact that the
1 2bounded linear operator D12°21: commutes with the double conditional
expectation operator PjJi (°r Pi|i^*
We now prove a lemma which will be used in simplifying these expressions
further.
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Lemma D.l. For h C * ) ^  , f(.*)eU2,
/ (E2[h(y )|y =?], HO), ?l (d?) = v ± y o
2
/ ( h ( n ) , g1 (n)E2 [g2 ( y2) f ( y 2) | y 1=n])1 Py (dn)
(D-3)
= <h,g1(y1)E2 [g2(y2)f(y2)|y1]>1
where g1(.*) are given by (2).
Proof. The proof follows from the following set of equalities where we are allowed to 
change orders of integration because and 112 are Hilbert spaces of random variables 
well defined under both measures:
/ (E2 [h(yi)|y9=c], f « ) ^  P  (d?) = / (/ h(n)P2 (dn|c), fa»,?,1. (d5)
Y Y 2 1 ylly2
1 y.
= /  J ( h ( n ) ,  f ( 0 ) , P 2 I v (dn |C )P2 (d?)
y 2 y ylly2 72
- / / (h(n), f(5)),P2 i (d?|y1=n)g1(n)g2(C)P1 (dn)
Y2 Y x y2|yl 1 yl
where, in the next to the last line, we have used continuity property of inner product 
.2in pulling out P i (dy.. | £) . Now, pulling the integration over YQ into the 
yl‘y2 Z
inner product, we further obtain
= / P  (dn)[(h(n), / g2(5)f(C)P2 , (d£|y1=n)),g1(n)
Y yl Y2 y2,yl 1
= / Py (dn)(h(n), g2(n) E2 [g2(y2)f(y2)|y1=n])1
which is the desired result.
Now, using (D-3) in (D-2) we obtain
k
62j(y;h) - y ^ h . h ^ + l /  (h(n), g h n ^ D ^ D ^ t g 2^ )  E2[h(yi) |y2] ly^nl^Py (dn)
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>v *
-I <h>DL D21Pl|lh>l - i <h>D21Di2Pt]lh>l
which verifies (26).
To verify (25) , we apply the result of Lemma D.l to (D™1) to obtain
2 1 r„2„2 r 2iJ(y;h) = < 1 1 ^  + <h,g (y1)D21D22 {f 2e [g (y2)Ez[x |y2]|y;L] 
+ D21E2 [g2(y2)E2[Y(yi)|y2]|y1]}>1 - <h,F2E1[x|y1]>1
- <h>g1(y1)D21F21E2 [g2(y2)E1 [x|y2]|y1]>1 - <h, (D^D2^  , x )Y>
* *
- <h»D22F2E1 [E2[x|y2] |y1]>1 = «h.Y^ - <h,2y>1 - «h.B^
where Z and 6 are defined by (27a) and (27b), respectively. This then completes 
the verification of (25) and (26) .
2. Derivation of an Expression for V i , the adjoint of P i1 11 111
Firstly note that
/ ¡lYiyp .hCyp^pl (dyp = / (y ^ )  , 1^ ) ) ^  (dyp
- T-l 1 ,lr 2E [OCyp.E [E [h(y1)|y2]|y1])1] - E  t C K y ^  ,E2 [h (yp  | y ]) ]
yl' y2
where we have used the smoothing property of conditional expectation under the 
probability measure P^ . Now, a further conditioning under P1 jt yields
= E1[(E1tY(y1)|y2], E2[h(y1)|y2])1],
and using (D—3) [cf. Lemma D-lJ this becomes equivalent to
= El[(g1(y1)E2 [g2(y2)E1 [Y (y1)|y2]|y1]> h(y )) ],
thus proving (32). The first expression in (32) follows by routine manipulations.
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Appendix E
In this appendix we show that the Stackelberg solution satisfying 
(10)-(11) is indeed an equilibrium solution— the so-called strong equilibrium 
of a decision problem with a modified (dynamic) information pattern. Towards 
this end, let us replace the original decision problem with one in which the 
decision (action) variables are y^I^ and Y2Gr2’ for DM1 and DM2> respectively, 
and the information pattern is dynamic (for DM2), with DM2 having access to the 
decision y^ of DM1. Let il^  and denote the strategy spaces of DM1 and DM2, 
respectively, under this new information pattern; furthermore denote their 
generic elements by 3^ and $ , respectively. Now, since DM1 has static 
information, all permissible policies 3^ will be constant mappings: -> T^, and 
hence . For DM2, on the other hand, all permissible policies will be
measurable mappings 32 : r1'>r2 • Finally, let J±: fi xfi^K. be the cost function
of DMi, satisfying the boundary condition
j .(6i >62) = J ±Cyv y2) VBjSY^r =a (E-l)
where Y2er2 is uniquely defined for each y^er^ by
Y2 = ^2(Yf) in r2 * (E-2)
s sNow, let (Y1,Y2)erixr2 be a Stackelberg solution to the original decision problem
with the unique mapping T2 satisfying (10). Note that , and hence
s s srelabelling as 32> and y^ as 3-^ , in (10) and (11), we obtain in view of (E-l)-(E-2)
V B1* B2> —  di^i»^2^ VB16U1
W 62> V(B1,62)eU1xU2,
s s ~ ~which clearly indicate that ( 3 ^ , is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
This is, in fact, a stronger equilibrium (called "strong equilibrium" [17]) because 
the second inequality is satisfied not only for 3^=3^, but for all
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